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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20070192-CA

CLARK CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON,
Defendant/Appellant.
:

Appellant is incarcerated

vs.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the conviction for Propelling Substance or Object at a
Correctional or Peace Officer, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-5-102.6, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Ann Boyden, Judge, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), which
grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal cases that do not involve
first-degree felony or capital offenses.

ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did trial court err in denying Defendant's motion at trial claiming a violation
of his right to a speedy trial?

Standard of Review: The trial court has discretion "to make reasonable
determinations concerning the existence of good cause" excusing the failure to bring a
charge to trial within the required time. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah
1991). However, "legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the
statute [Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) (2003)] which grants the trial court discretion
[must be] reviewed for correctness." Id. at 425.]
Preservation: Appellant did not request a transcript. The record contains only
Appellee's proposed jury instructions (R.) and the trial court's final jury instructions
(R.). Appellant made oral motions at trial claiming the lack of a speedy trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following

are statutes, rules, or constitutional

provisions whose

interpretation is relevant to this appeal:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

U.S. Const. Amd. VI.
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12.
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (2003).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (2005).
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged and convicted with Propelling Substance or Object at a
Correctional or Peace Officer, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-5-102.6, a Class A misdemeanor. This charge was supported by the sworn
1 The 120-day disposition rule has largely been eliminated. See 2007 Utah Laws Ch. 14 (S.B. 125). However,
the relevant period for this case was prior to the enactment of this change.
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testimony of three officers, as well as a videotape of the altercation between Appellant
and the officers. The jury spent a mere 13 minutes deliberating before convicting
Appellant.
Appellant argues that the length of time between December 12, 2005 and
February 7, 2007 violates his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 8, 2005, Appellant spat in the face of Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Deputy Wayne Wilson at the Adult Detention Center, where Dep. Wilson
worked. Appellant's spitting was witnessed by Salt Lake City Police Department
Detective Kim Crowley and Dep. Scott Parker, who were assisting Dep. Wilson with
booking Appellant into jail. Moreover, the whole event was captured on video tape.
An Information was filed on December 12, 2005 alleging the one count of
propelling a substance at a correctional officer. On December 14, 2005 Appellant was
arraigned and assigned a public defender. At the first pretrial hearing on January 17,
2006, Appellant's attorney, Sharla Dunroe, requested more time to look into
Appellant's pending felony cases in an attempt to propose a global offer. Discovery,
including a copy of the videotape, was provided to the defense on February 10, 2006.
At the next pretrial hearing on March 13, 2006, Appellant failed to appear. At the
third pretrial hearing, on April 10, 2006, a trial was scheduled for June 7, 2006. Due
3

to the large number of cases set for trial on that date, Appellant's trial was bumped and
a scheduling conference was scheduled for August 22, 2006.
In the summer of 2006, the Salt Lake Legal Defenders ("LDA") concluded that
Christine Seaman, and not Ms. Donroe, should handle Appellant's case. At the next
scheduled jury trial on October 18, 2006, however, Defendant refused to work with
Defense counsel and another trial date was set. At the final pretrial conference on
January 8, 2007, Ms. Seaman informed the court that Appellant wished for Ms.
Dunroe to represent him and not Ms. Seaman. Judge Boyden granted LDA's motion
to withdraw and for Appellant to represent himself.
On February 7, 2007, Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury of his peers.
In an oral pretrial motion, Appellant claimed his right to a speedy trial were violated.
Judge Boyden denied the motion. While the trial lasted several hours, the jury only
required 13 minutes to find Appellant guilty of Count I.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant seeks to appeal his conviction by jury without following the briefing
requirements set forth in appellate procedure. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006).
Appellant deprived the Court of an objective account of the evidence against
Appellant at trial by not marshaling the facts in light most favorable to his conviction.
Appellant inhibits this Court from making a decision on the merits by failing to
adequately brief the court on the issues for appeal, depriving the Court of the best
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argument of both adversarial parties. This in turn requires the Court to do Appellant's
work for his, something which the Court is not usually inclined to do.
Even if Appellant had properly followed appellate procedural requirements, his
claims of error would still fail on the merits. Appellant mistakenly argues that he was
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the 13 month interval between
his initial court appearance and his conviction.
In fact, the case law clearly states that time alone does not create a speedy trial
violation. Rather, an appellant must prove that the delay was lengthy, the reason for
that delay was improper, the appellant timely asserted his right, and was prejudiced by
the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); State v. Trqfhy, 799 P.2d 704,
406, 408-09 (Utah 1990).
Therefore, this Court should summarily AFFIRM the trial court's conviction and
DISMISS this appeal.

ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FACTS.
Because Appellant did not meet the marshaling requirement, this Court must

rely on the trial court's findings. "To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to
support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when
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viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, | 14,
989 P.2d 1065 (quotations and citations omitted). "If the evidence is inadequately
marshaled, this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the
evidence." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 19, 100 P.3d 1177.
The marshaling requirement calls for "a party challenging factual findings to
marshal all of the evidence and the inferences that can be made from the evidence in
support of the findings" since "it is through this material that [appellate courts] review
the findings." State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, f 20 n. 11, 68 P.3d 1052.
Appellants who adequately marshal the facts " 'present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at [the hearing] which
supports the very findings [she] resists.' " State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ^ 17, 124 P.3d
235 (citation omitted). That is, the Appellee must play the "devil's advocate" by
"removing] [his] own prejudices and fully embracing] the [State's] position." Chen,
at *[f 78 (internal quotations omitted).
"[S]imply rearguing and recharacterizing the trial court's factual findings does
not constitute marshaling." Clark, at ^f 17. That is, when an appellant "merely recites
his own version of the facts, and presents none of the evidence supporting the
conviction[]," appellate courts "will not consider" the merits of Appellant's case
further. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, If 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citing State v.
Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah CtApp.1991)).
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Here, Appellant offered no facts in support of his conviction. As such, this
Court should not consider Appellant's claims of error any further and assume that all
findings of the trial court are adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial.
II.

APPELLANT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF THE COURT ON
THE MERITS.
Because Appellant did not properly brief the Court on claims of error, this

Court should decline to address the claims on their merits and summarily affirm the
jury's conviction below. A sufficiently briefed argument "contain[s] the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). "[T]o be
adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal analysis.' " State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \
22, 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,17, 1 P.3d 1108).
Mere "bald citation to authority," devoid of any analysis, is not adequate. State
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 31, 973 P.2d 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule
implicitly requires a "development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v.
Green, 2005 UT 9, \ 11, 108 P.3d 710.
The Court "may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues."
Lee, 2006 UT 5 at \ 22 (citations omitted). "This court has routinely declined to
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consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." Burns v.
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted).
In the case at hand, Appellant merely cities various authority, declining to link
that authority to his claims of error. Moreover, Appellant baldly states that "the State
has only 180 days to get a case to trial" and that "[t]he State cannot prosecute this case
because it took more than a year to get to trial" without any citation to authority.
(Appellant's Brief at 2). Because of the insufficient analysis, this Court should
summarily affirm the jury's conviction in the court below.

III.

EVEN IF APPELLANT HAD PROPERLY FOLLOWED
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, THIS APPEAL WOULD STILL FAIL
ON THE MERITS; DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
WAS NOT VIOLATED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY UNDER
BARKER.
Defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial was not violated by the

District Attorney because the length of the delay was brief, the reason for the delay
was proper, there is dispute as to Defendant's desire for a speedy trial, and Defendant
was not prejudiced by the delay.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court laid out a
four part balancing test to determine whether a given defendant's right to a speedy trial
had been violated: "Length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530.
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In State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), defendant was arrested on March
2, 1988, set for trial on April 13, 1988, only to have the State dismiss the case without
prejudice due to an unavailable key witness on April 13, 1988. Id. at 705. Trafny was
subsequently arrested and placed in custody by federal authorities on June 6, 1988. Id.
On June 3, 1988, Defendant was arrested by the state on the original charges and was
convicted by a jury on November 10, 1988 (Trafny had requested a continuance on
August 5, 1988). Id. Using the Barker balancing test for both United States and Utah
Constitutions, the Trafney court held that Trafny's right to a speedy trial had not been
violated. Id. at 706, 708-09.
"Once the charges were dismissed without prejudice Trafny was a free man as
far as the State was concerned." Id. The 42 days (March 2 to April 13) incarceration
and the 119 days (July 13 to November 10) delay "does not rise to the level oiper se
prejudice, nor is it presumptively prejudicial." Id. Moreover, the court held that the
"unavailability of [a] witness is a valid reason for the State to ask for a continuance
and a dismissal without prejudice." Id. at 707 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). "[W]e
have not adhered... strictly to 30-day provision" of Utah Code Ann § 77-1-6. Id. at
708.
Utah courts "have held that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial was
not violated even when the time between arrest and trial was in excess of 30 days." Id.
at 708 n.16. In fact, in State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987), the court held that
four and half years between arrest and trial did not violate the defendant's right to a
9

speedy trial. Id. at 632. "Four and one-half years between arrest and trial is an
extraordinary period of time. As in Barker, very little of that time can be attributed to a
strong excuse." Yet the court found lack of prejudice was a key factor outweighing
this length of time.
There is no evidence in the record that defendant's defense was impaired. The
evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Defendant, however, contends
that he was prejudiced by the fading memories of the prosecution's witnesses.
This is not prejudicial to defendant. First of all, the few instances of fading
memories concerned insignificant facts. Second, if there was prejudice to
anyone by faded memories, it was to the prosecution, not to defendant.
Id. " 'When a defendant's [own] actions cause delay in the trial date, the right to a
speedy trial is temporarily waived by those actions.' " State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,
130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991)). "This is true whether or not the reason for the delay is meritorious."
Ossana, 739 P.2d at 631. "[W]hen a defendant affirmatively agrees to a scheduled
trial date and offers no subsequent objection to that date, he cannot then turn around
and count those days leading up to the agreed upon trial date in his determination of
delay for speedy trial purposes." State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, ^28, 138 P.3d 97
(citing Snyder, 932 P.2d at 130; State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) (holding that the defendant had temporarily waived the right to a speedy
trial when he agreed to postpone trial, filed several continuances, and changed counsel
twice)).
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State v. Mathis, 319 P.2d 134 (Utah 1957), held that a 'speedy trial' is
"necessarily a flexible term to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the
practical exigencies encountered in the handling of the business of the courts." Id. at
136. In State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985), the defendant, who was charged on
February 10, 1983, for a burglary committed in August 1979 and was tried in February
1984, was not denied the right to a speedy trial where there was no showing that the
delay in bringing the charge against him was intentional or designed to produce an
advantage for prosecution. Id. at 283-84.
In Barker, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the difference between the Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial and other constitutional rights is that "the deprivation
of the right may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense
tactic. As the time...[grows] witnesses may become unavailable or their memories
may fade. ... [D]eprvation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the
accused's ability to defendant himself." 407 U.S. at 521.
In the present case, to apply Barker, we first look at the length of the delay.
Despite Defendant's assertion, any length of time is not presumptively prejudicial.
Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708-09; cf. Def. Mot. to Dismiss Case No. 065612920, at 3.
Defendant claims that the delay should run from August 12, 2005 until April 19, 2007,
totaling 615 days. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Case No. 065612920, at 2). However, under
Conejo, the delay is actually from August 12, 2005 until November 30, 2005 (minus
the seven days in October 2005 Defendant was granted a continuance) plus January
11

24, 2007 until February 15, 2007 (from Defendant's first sign of awareness of the
charge until his assertion of his right to a speedy trial)— totaling 127 days—a fraction
of the time deemed constitutional in Ossana.
Like Ossana, the evidence against Appellee is overwhelming—the consistent
testimony of three officers corroborated by a video recording of Defendant spitting at a
corrections officer.
Second, Barker compels the Court to examine the reason for the delay. Here,
part of the delay was due Appellant's failure to appear at the March 13, 2006 preliminary
hearing and his unwilliness to work with his assigned public defender after his trial had been
rescheduled—four months. Another portion of the delay was due to the overburdened
trial calendar of district court judges—bumping his June 7, 2006 trial date into a
scheduling conference for August 22, 2006.
Third, Appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until the day of the trial
(February 7, 2007), 14 months after Appellant's case was refilled.
Fourth, Appellant claims prejudice per se via the lengthy period between the
issuance of the Information and the actual trial on the merits. As stated above, Utah
courts have consistently held this is insufficient grounds for a successful Speedy Trial
challenge.
Under the totality of the circumstances and considering all four Barker factors,
Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the delay.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant's brief fails to marshal the facts in the light most favorable to his
conviction. Moreover, Appellant's claims of error are not preserved on the record, nor
doe he claim plain error. Appellant's brief fails to show a meritorious position by
providing sufficient analysis of the facts to the appropriate case law. This means that
the court is not obliged to analyze Appellant's claims on the merits and may
summarily affirm the jury's conviction below.
Regardless, if the Court proceeds to address the merits of the appeal, the length
of the delay is not the sole factor in the determination of whether Appellant's speedy
trial rights were violated. When all four Barker factors are examined in their totality,
Appellant has failed to establish that the delay caused any prejudicial effect on his
case. Therefore, this Court should AFFIRM Appellant's conviction and DISMISS
Appellant's appeal.

RESPECTFULLY submitted on JJL August 2007.

LOHRA L. MILLER
Salt Lake County District Attorney

tfarlies M. Cdpe
/
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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I, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of the foregoing
brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140320,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Clark C. Robinson #153384,
Appellant acting in Pro Se9 at Utah State Penitentiary, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah
84020 on this %K

day of August 2007.

les M. Cope
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Appellant as indicated
above this •il'Zilay of August 2007.
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ADDENDUM A
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law....
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article I, Section 12.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right...to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed.
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
RULE 24. BRIEFS

(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:

(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's
fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for
such an award.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2003)
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or
other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall
15

deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent
of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of
written notice.

(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported
by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
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